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I. INTRODUCTION

James Duane, the executive director of the Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional
Council of Governments, unflatteringly described Ohio’s zoning practices in 1998 as
“a patchwork of weak law, fragmented code, and a plethora of court cases. Local
day-to-day land-use activity appears to center on individual zoning and subdivision
approvals with little attention to how those discrete actions compose the big
picture.”1 Duane’s concern arises from Ohio’s “home-rule amendment” under
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that municipalities
have “authority to exercise all powers of local self-government . . . .”2
Critics of the amendment, like Ohio State University Agricultural Economics
Professor Lawrence W. Libby, argue that this home-rule legal and cultural tradition
impedes regional coordination among Ohio localities.3 Others, like Columbia Law
School Professor Richard Briffault, go further and argue that local self-interested
zoning policies impose economic, environmental, and social externalities on the
region as a whole.4
This Note argues that Ohio’s home-rule principles foster a regional “race to the
bottom”5 and proposes that the Ohio General Assembly pass legislation creating
regional governments to combat the absence of coordination among regional
localities.
The fundamental problem under current home-rule principles is informational
(hereafter the information problem), where localities are blinded from policies that
affect their economic health because they fail to recognize that regional localities
operate as interdependent, economic players.6 The information problem prevents
1 Stuart Meck & Jason Wittenberg, Working Paper: A Smart Growth Agenda for Ohio,
OHIO SMART GROWTH AGENDA (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio), Fall 1998, at 33,
available at http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/ecocityjournalv5n101112fall1998.pdf.
2 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the
130th GA 2013-2014).
3

Meck & Wittenberg, supra note 1, at 33.

4 Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1115, 1147 (1996).
5 See id. Because of the absence of regional coordination, interlocal tax competition
causes wealthier inner city residents to flee to low property tax-rate havens in the suburbs. See
id. at 1134-35. The inner city’s poorer population drives up per capita costs of local services,
the city has to raise property taxes to generate needed revenue, and this further reinforces the
incentives for those with the means to do so to leave the inner city. Id. at 1137. This interlocal
tax race causes both urban sprawl and decay in metropolitan urban cities, and this system may
damage the economic health of the entire metropolitan region. See id. at 1137.
6

See id. at 1137.
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localities from developing the regional consciousness necessary to implement
meaningful regional coordination. Regional governments would combat the
information problem by creating a vehicle for regional coordination and an ability to
internalize a locality’s externalities by forging policies that bind localities.7
Although regional governments would have to “apply to all parts of the state
alike”8 to be Constitutional under Article XVIII,9 Section 3, this Note will solely
focus on the impact of a state’s regional governments on metropolitan areas because
of their importance, populously and economically.10
This is not a call for more government, but a call to streamline already existing
government into more efficient mechanisms with sufficient authority to direct
regional land-use issues. In the last fifty years, states have combated regional issues
through “special purpose governments.”11 Special-purpose governments, like the
Ohio Development Services Agency (ODSA),12 are independent public agencies
created under state law to combat specific issues.13 A special-purpose government’s
limited purpose can lead to hundreds of independent agencies within a metropolitan
area.14 The profusion of municipal15 and special purpose governments within a
metropolitan area16 dilutes a special purpose government’s political accountability
7

Id. at 1122.

8

City of Canton v. Ohio, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 21
(Ohio 2010).
9

See id.

10

Briffault, supra note 4, at 1116 (“most Americans live not in discrete, compact
localities, but rather in sprawling metropolitan areas. In 1990, 193 million people, or 78
percent of the total population of the United States, lived in metropolitan areas, as defined by
the Census Bureau.”).
11

See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1781
(2002).
12 See
OHIO DEVELOPMENT SERVICES AGENCY, http://development.ohio.gov/feat
/whatisdsa.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). The ODSA is charged with the responsibility to
attract and retain jobs in Ohio. Id
13

See Frug, supra note 11, at 1781.

14

Id. at 1783.

15 Cleveland’s County, Cuyahoga County, has about 58 units of government. Joe Frolik,
Regional Government vs. Home Rule, TEACHING CLEVELAND 7, http://www.teachingcleveland.org
/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=602:regional-government-vs-home-rule&catid=50:regional-govt-vs-home-rule&Itemid=124. Also considering school districts and special
taxing districts, there are about 100 units of government in Cuyahoga County. Id.
16

See Frug, supra note 11, at 1784.

Not one major metropolitan area is governed by a single all-encompassing general
purpose local government. Some metropolitan areas have special-purpose regional
governmental entities. These bodies, however, are sometimes limited in territorial
scope to just a portion of the metropolitan area. They are typically governed by
appointed rather than elected officials. Most importantly, they nearly always lack the
plenary taxing, regulatory, and service-delivery authority characteristic of general
purpose municipal governments.
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because of voter confusion, apathy, and the fact that special purpose governments
are typically run by unelected political appointees.17
This Note will discuss in Part II (A) how home rule became law in Ohio, (B)
what regional problems critics attribute to home-rule principles, (C) the principal
arguments for home rule, and (D) what regional governments other states have
implemented.
Part III addresses how a regional consciousness would internalize the
information problem. In exploring this theory, I analyze (A) how regional
governments would be constitutional under Ohio’s home-rule amendment; (B) why
statutory intervention by the state is needed to solve this problem; and (C) how
regional governments present a more effective structure for the economic health of
Ohio’s regions.
II. HOME RULE IN OHIO
A. How Home Rule Became Law in Ohio
During the nineteenth century, the response to regional fragmentation was
annexation.18 All major cities during this period—Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
Chicago, and Cleveland—grew by annexing their suburbs.19 In 1890, New York City
grew to 1.4 million residents on Manhattan, and across the river, the City of
Brooklyn grew twentyfold between 1840 and 1890.20 In the face of opposition from
wealthy suburbanites in Brooklyn, New York’s state legislature consolidated
Brooklyn and four other boroughs into New York City in 1898 to create the world’s
largest city and first metropolitan government.21 For the next five decades, New
York operated as largely its own suburbs, and the city thrived as one of the most
successful urban communities in the country with the best hospitals, schools, and
city services.22
Ohio’s General Assembly during the early nineteenth century went the other
direction by enhancing the power of its municipalities to prevent annexation.23
Cleveland’s population, too, was booming in the early twentieth century, as its
population grew from 381,000 in 1900 to 797,000 in 1920 and became the fifth
largest city in the country.24 As in New York City, overpopulation in the inner city
Briffault, supra note 4, at 1117.
17

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1146.

18

Id. at 1117.

19

Id.

20

DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 18 (2d ed. 1995).

21

Id.

22 Id. at 19. Between 1900 and 1950, New York City captured over 50 percent of its
suburban growth; after 1990, the city contributed -13 percent of its suburban growth. This
comparison demonstrates that when New York City was a metropolitan government, the city
thrived. When operating as a central city to a metropolitan region, as it did after 1950, the
city’s problems began. Id.
23

See Frolik, supra note 15, at 3.

24

Id.
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led those with the means to do so to move to the suburbs, and a cordon of suburbs
quickly incorporated around the city.25 But unlike the consolidation of New York
City, Cleveland’s suburbs, armed with new home-rule powers in 1912, successfully
parried any further annexation efforts by Cleveland during its formative population
boom.26
Before Ohio’s home-rule amendment was ratified in 1912, the state had
preemption authority to override any law passed by a locality.27 Under “Dillon’s
Rule,” Ohio municipalities were only able to exercise those powers delegated by the
General Assembly.28 Progressives, who advocated for greater self-autonomy, railed
against state preemption of local decisions.29 As this was before the advent of the
interstate highway system, municipalities were relatively autonomous and still had
vast tracts of vacant land within their limits.30 Newton Baker, a Progressive who was
elected Mayor of Cleveland in 1911, convinced Ohio’s 1912 Constitutional
Convention to add strong home-rule language to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the
Ohio Constitution.31
Ohio’s home-rule amendment says, “[m]unicipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws.”32 With the addition of the landmark decision by the Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., which held local zoning33 to be
constitutional,34 suburban independence was further enhanced by empowering them

25

See id. at 3-4.

26 See id. at 5. In 1912, delegates proposed, and the electorate later ratified in the fall,
strong home-rule language to Ohio’s Constitution at the fourth Ohio Constitutional
Convention. Melanie Shwab, Note, Crossing the Home-Rule Boundaries Should Be
Mandatory: Advocating for a Watershed Approach to Zoning and Land Use in Ohio, 58 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 463, 485 (2010).
27

See Frolik, supra note 15, at 3.

28

See Shwab, supra note 26, at 485.

29

See Frolik, supra note 15, at 3.

30

Id. at 7.

31

Id. at 3.

32

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the
130th GA 2013-2014).
33 “The legislative division of a region, esp. a municipality, into separate districts with
different regulations within the districts for land use, building size, and the like.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1757 (10th ed. 2014).
34

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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to use exclusionary zoning35 to shield themselves36 from undesirable outgrowth of
the inner-city.37
B. Regional Problems Critics Attribute to Home-Rule Principles
Today, critics of home-rule principles (hereafter regionalists) argue that cities,
like Cleveland, which are locked in by their suburbs and bereft of means to either
grow geographically or coordinate meaningfully with other localities are at a
competitive disadvantage.38 The disadvantage is that these cities do not
proportionally share in the growth of their metropolitan areas and are devoid of
means to adequately address regional issues with regional solutions.39
David Rusk, a regionalist and former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico, calls
these types of cities “inelastic cities.”40 Rusk says inelastic cities “[cannot] compete
with new suburbs in offering the desired suburban-style model for family life.”41
Incapable of capturing a share of suburban-type development, inelastic cities
disproportionately fail to capture the growth of their metropolitan areas.42 “A mostly
built-out county[,] like Cuyahoga County[,] operates at a bit of a disadvantage.
Family sizes are smaller than years ago; so it takes more homes—usually new
homes—to grow. The fastest growing places usually have a lot of previously
undeveloped land.”43
By contrast, Columbus, Ohio, an elastic city, has remained elastic in the face of
Ohio’s home-rule amendment because the city used its water and sewer system as a
means to geographically grow within Franklin County.44 Between 1953 and 2013,
Columbus grew from 39 to more than 210 square miles by requiring localities that
wanted access to its water and sewer systems to annex to the city.45 Former
Cleveland Planning Director, Hunter Morrison, said, “‘[t]he energy (of development)
35

“Exclusionary zoning has been defined as land use regulation which raises the price
of residential access to a particular area and thereby denies that access to members of low
income groups.” Stuart Meck & Kenneth Pearlman, Oh. Plan. & Zoning L. § 6:13, in
BALDWIN'S OHIO HANDBOOK S ERIES OHIO P LANNING AND ZONING LAW (2014 ed.).
36

“[T]he goal of incorporation was often very clearly to create an enclave for ‘our
people.’ Sometimes that was people who looked or prayed alike. Other times, the restrictions
were more economic in nature . . . . ‘The impetus for zoning in Northeast Ohio was exclusion’
. . . .” Frolik, supra note 16, at 5.
37

See id. at 4-5.

38

See RUSK, supra note 20, at 20.

39

See id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43 Rich Exner, Census Estimates Show Greater Cleveland Population Down Slightly, THE
PLAIN DEALER (Mar. 17, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral
/index.ssf/2013/03/census_estimates_show_greater.html.
44

See Frolik, supra note 15, at 6.

45

Id.
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goes to the new,’ - and when a business or a developer wants to build something new
in Central Ohio, Columbus has room for them to do it.”46
Cities that have flourished in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, like
Houston, Phoenix, San Diego, and Albuquerque have all done so through the
regional solution of annexation.47 A combination of permissive annexation laws,
restrictions on the incorporation of new cities on the urban fringe, and political will
enabled annexation in these cities.48
Today, Columbus is growing jobs at a rate more than three times the rest of
Ohio.49 From April 1 through June 30, 2013, Columbus’s job rate grew 1.6 percent,
while the state’s was at .5 percent.50 Columbus is the only big city in Ohio and
western Pennsylvania whose population grew faster than the nation’s since 1980.51
One cited reason for this has been Columbus’s ability to “streamlin[e] government
and invest[] in the right things.”52
From 2011 to 2012, Cuyahoga County lost 4,872 residents, the second biggest
decline in the country during that period and second only to Detroit’s Wayne
County.53 It also may be getting worse.54 USA Today reported in 2011 that Cleveland
lost 17% of its population from 2001 to 2011 and saw more residents abandon the
city from 2000 to 2010 than in the 1990s.55
In inelastic cities unable to capture regional growth, metropolitan growth is not
only disproportionately exported to its suburbs but the regions also reflect a sharp
income and racial disparity between city and county.56 A 2009 U.S. Census Bureau
Survey revealed that Cuyahoga County had a median household income of $41,101,
while Cleveland’s median household income was $24,687.57 The African American
and Hispanic populations surrounding inelastic cities are typically concentrated in
46

Id. at 6.

47

Frug, supra note 11, at 1769.

48

See id.

49

Mark Williams, Central Ohio Leads the Way in Job Growth, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Aug. 15, 2013, 1:43 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/public/2013/08/14
/central-ohio-added-jobs-in-second-quarter.html.
50

Id.

51

Id.

52 Rana Foroohar, How Columbus, Ohio Bounced Back from the Recession, TIME
MAGAZINE (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://business.time.com/2012/09/27/how-columbusohio-bounced-back-from-the-recession/.
53

Exner, supra note 43.

54

See Dennis Cauchon, Population Drastically Declines in Ohio Cities, USA TODAY
(Mar. 10, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/census/2011-03-09-ohiocensus_N.htm.
55

Id.

56

See Frolik, supra note 15.

57

Robert L. Smith, Census Shows Cleveland Is the Second-Poorest City in The United
States, THE PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 29, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro
/2010/09/census_shows_cleveland_is_the.html.
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the inner city.58 “[T]he segregation and concentration of impoverished populations in
specific areas . . . increase[s] the social and public costs of income inequality.”59 This
destabilizing feature of inelastic cities stirs up racial, political, and social tensions
and makes it less likely for regions to develop a regional consciousness.60
But while suburbs disproportionately capture metropolitan growth, they still
continue to rely on central cities as the setting of many specialized activities—like
work settings, cultural amenities, sports venues, and medical services.61 Not only do
affluent regional localities surrounding inelastic cities “free ride” by benefiting from
metropolitan living and sharing in few metropolitan costs,62 but these localities also
maintain this position by using exclusionary zoning.63 By means of a wealth test,
exclusionary zoning keeps out undesirables who bring less to a locality’s tax base
than costs in social services.64
When one regional locality uses exclusionary zoning, this triggers other localities
to do the same to prevent undesirable growth from being diverted to them.65 The
aggregate use of exclusionary zoning causes urban sprawl by driving up home prices
and forcing new homeowners to seek cheaper housing in the metropolitan fringe.66
Over the last quarter-century, “many metropolitan areas have experienced far greater
territorial expansion than population growth.”67
This “leapfrog pattern of development” has substantial costs on a region.68 The
geographic growth of a metropolitan area consumes natural resources and
environmentally sensitive areas.69 According to Smart Growth America,70 “the
degree of sprawl is more strongly related to the severity of maximum ozone days [in
a metropolitan area] than per capita income or employment levels.”71 By curbing
58

RUSK, supra note 20, at 27.

59

Myron Orfield & Nicholas Wallace, The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971: The
Twin Cities’ Struggle and Blueprint for Regional Cooperation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
591, 604 (2007).
60

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1142.

61

See id. at 1139.

62

See id. at 1149.

63

See id. at 1139-41.

64

Id. at 1136.

65

Id. at 1134.

66

See id. at 1133.

67

Id. at 1135.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

“Smart Growth America is the only national organization dedicated to researching,
advocating for and leading coalitions to bring smart growth practices to more communities
nationwide.” SMART GROWTH AMERICA, http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/about/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2014).
71 REID EWING ET AL., MEASURING SPRAWL AND ITS IMPACT, SMART GROWTH AMERICA, 23
(2002), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/research/measuring-sprawl-and-itsimpact/.
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urban sprawl and implementing controlled planning, a 1992 study by the Center for
Urban Studies at Rutgers University projected that over a 20-year span New Jersey
would save $1.38 billion in local roads, state roads, water, sewer, and school costs.72
It would also save 30,000 acres of farmland, 2.5 million gallons of water use, and
800,000 gallons of sewage.73
Today, Ohio is one of the most land-hungry states in the nation74 and the state’s
home-rule principles reinforce this problem.75 Even though between 1950 and 2002
Ohio ranked 22nd in the country for population growth, it ranked 2nd for rate of
prime farmland loss, where the state lost 7 million acres in that period.76 The
farmland loss is greatest in metropolitan fringe communities, where development
pressure is highest.77 The trend of outward migration has resulted in high rates of
abandonment in metropolitan inner cities and new development on the metropolitan
fringe that is expensive for taxpayers to build and maintain.78
Ohio’s loss of farmland and degree of urban sprawl is also reflected in the
changing trends of its population density.79 Between 1979-2006, the average person
per acre in Northeast Ohio declined 22 percent.80 In the 1980s and 1990s,
Youngstown, Ohio lost about 40 percent of its population, and between 1960 and
2000, Cleveland lost almost two-thirds of its assessed property valuation.81 Rusk
says “[t]o end Cleveland’s isolation you need a regional solution. You need to open
up economically . . . . If you don’t, it will affect the economic competitiveness of the
entire region.”82
72

Id.

73

Id.

74 See David Beach, The Smart Growth Challenge in Ohio, FUNDERS’ NETWORK FOR
SMART GROWTH AND LIVABLE COMMUNITIES (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, OH),
Oct. 2002, at 13, available at http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/ohiosmartgrowth0210.pdf
(“Ohio’s ‘developed land’ increased 21.0% during the 1990s compared to a 4.7% increase in
population-a 4.5 ratio of growth in developed land to population growth. This was the sixth
worst ratio among all states, according to a recent study by urban analyst David Rusk.”).
75

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1134-35.

76 Marc Kovac, Ohio Ranks Second in Nation for Loss of Farmland, THE DAILY RECORD
(Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.the-daily-record.com/farm/2004/12/14/ohio-ranks-second-innation-for-loss-of-farmland.
77

Id.

78

Vibrant NEO 2040: A Vision, Framework, and Action Products for Our Future,
NORTHEAST OHIO SUSTAINABLE CMTYS. CONSORTIUM INITIATIVE (NEOSCC, Cleveland, OH),
Feb. 2014, at 31-32, available at http://vibrantneo.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/VibrantNEO-Final-Report_3-31-14_lowres_ALL.pdf.
79 See NORTHEAST OHIO SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES CONSORTIUM, Northeast Ohio’s
Population
Has Been Spreading
Out, http://cat.neoscc.org/findings/populationdecline/northeast-ohios-population-has-been-spreading-out/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
80

Id.

81

See Beach, supra note 74, at 14.

82

Past the Point of No Return?, MOVING TO CORN FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland
Heights, OH), 1996, at 60, available at http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources
/movingtocornfields.pdf.
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Because public services are primarily funded by a locality’s tax base, an affluent
locality with an ample tax base can provide better services at a lower tax rate.83 Both
the better services and lower tax rates further attract the region’s affluent.84 More
affluent localities maintain this position by deploying “exclusionary zoning
techniques as an informal wealth test that keeps out newcomers who bring less to the
locality in tax base than cost in local services . . . .”85 The flight of inner-cities’
affluent will reinforce the disparity in tax burdens and local services within a
region.86 “Poverty in metropolitan areas is increasingly concentrated in the older, socalled central city and in older suburbs.”87
The concentration of a region’s poor into these localities tends to drive up the
costs of local services, which requires these localities to raise tax rates to provide
“lower quality basic services.”88 The higher tax rates and lower quality services of a
locality with greater concentrations of a region’s poor provide that locality’s affluent
with just another incentive to leave.89 In an interview with the Wilson Center, Rusk
said,
There’s a ninety-percent correlation between the elasticity of a city, as
measured by its ability to capture the growth of its central county or
counties, and its current municipal-bond rating . . . I don’t need to know
who the mayor is, or the council, or what form of government they have,
or anything about it. Just tell me . . . what is the elasticity of the city, and I
can pretty well tell you what the bond rating of that city is going to be.90
Decaying inner cities can also hurt a region by impeding a region’s ability to
compete in an increasingly globalized world.91 “In the long run . . . interlocal
competition, interlocal wealth disparities, and the resulting inferior services and
infrastructure in central cities can bring down the economic base of the region as a
whole . . . .”92
Metropolitan areas are the face of a region, and in some states, the face of the
state.93 But regions with a deteriorating urban core, social tensions, and

83

Briffault, supra note 4, at 1136.

84

See id. at 1136-37.

85

Id. at 1136.

86

See id. at 1137.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90 Dialogue at the Wilson Center: Cities Without Suburbs, WILSON CENTER (MHz
Networks broadcast Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/dialogue-program/citieswithout-suburbs.
91

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1137-41.

92

Id. at 1140.

93

See Beach, supra note 74, at 13.
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environmental problems94 have trouble attracting businesses and competing
globally.95 Cleveland’s suburbs shared in the pain suffered by Cleveland between
2000 and 2010.96 “Nearby suburbs shrank, too, although some growth occurred in
distant suburbs.”97
Urban sprawl further exacerbates a region’s ability to globally compete because
of the cost to taxpayers, demonstrated by the high correlation between a metropolitan
area’s size and the number of local governments.98 This cost reflects increased
administrative costs of more mayors, governmental personnel, school districts,
police, and firemen.99 But this cost also reflects the less obvious costs of overlapping
regional infrastructure and providing services to distant localities.100 Abandonment
of the inner city also incurs costs of the loss of homeowner equity, visual blight,
demolition, and maintenance of an infrastructure for non-existent residents.101
Even though Franklin County has less than 80,000 less residents than Cuyahoga
County,102 it spends far less money on government.103 Cuyahoga County, a county
with 457.19 square miles104 and fifty-nine municipal governments,105 spends $800
million more per year than Franklin County,106 a county with 532.19 square miles107
and forty three municipal governments.108 “Researchers hired by The Fund For Our
Economic Future-a foundation-driven consortium that is trying to jumpstart
development in Northeast Ohio-have identified the ‘legacy cost’ of excess
government as a drag on this region’s growth because it adds to the bottom-line of
doing almost everything.”109
94 “Sprawling development destroys valuable farm land open space, natural areas and
streams.” Why Worry about Suburban Sprawl?, MOVING TO CORN FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland,
Cleveland
Heights,
OH),
1996,
at
17,
available
at
http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/movingtocornfields.pdf.
95

See Beach, supra note 74, at 13.

96

See Cauchon, supra note 54.

97

Id.

98

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1120.

99

See Beach, supra note 74, at 24.

100

See id.

101

VIBRANT NEO 2014, supra note 78, at 33-34.

102

Exner, supra note 43.

103

Frolik, supra note 15, at 7.

104 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS (2013), available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39035.html.
105

Frolik, supra note 15, at 7.

106

Id.

107 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS (2013), available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39049.html .
108

See
FRANKLIN
COUNTY,
CITIES,
TOWNSHIPS,
&
VILLAGES,
www.franklincountyohio.gov/fc/content/citTownVil.cfm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
109

Frolik, supra note 15, at 7.
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James Frank, associate professor of urban and regional planning at Florida State
University, estimated in 1989 that providing services to a three-unit per acre
development located ten miles from central facilities and employment centers costs
taxpayers a $48,000 premium.110 This premium cost reflects providing infrastructure
costs, like water mains, schools, fire stations, treatment plants, and roads.111 By
placing that same home closer to central facilities in a twelve-unit per acre
development with an equal mix of townhouses, garden apartments, and single-family
homes, the premium cost could be reduced fifty percent.112
Although regional governments can contract with other localities to address
regional issues,113 affluent regional localities will not delegate their land-use
authority because they would be agreeing to share in metropolitan costs, like
affordable housing, social services, and a reduction in its taxable base.114 Thus, state
intervention is needed for regional land-use coordination to occur.115
C. Home-Rule Advocates’ Principal Arguments
Home-rule advocates (hereafter localists) justify their support by arguing that
localism fosters citizen participation, community, and efficiency.116 Localists argue
that by taking power out of the hands of local governments regionalism threatens a
core value of local autonomy.117 Small government fosters civic participation
because the greater a citizen’s impact, the more likely that citizen will participate in
110

Kevin Kasowski, Sprawling Development Costs All of Us a Bundle, MOVING TO CORN
FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland Heights), 1996, at 24, available at
http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/movingtocornfields.pdf.
111

Id.

112

Id.

113 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §167.01 (West, Westlaw through Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the
130th GA 2013-2014) (“[G]overning bodies of any two or more counties, municipal
corporations, townships, special districts, school districts, or other political subdivisions may
enter into an agreement with each other, or with the governing bodies of any counties,
municipal corporations, townships, special districts, school districts or other political
subdivisions of any other state to the extent that laws of such other state permit, for
establishment of a regional council consisting of such political subdivisions.”).
114

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1122.

115

See Beach, supra note 74, at 24; see also Briffault, supra note 4, at 1122 (“Such
interlocal agreements are less likely when they require the cooperation of several localities
scattered across a metropolitan region, or when the benefits are long-term and diffuse while
the costs, in terms of loss of local regulatory or fiscal autonomy, are immediate and concrete.
As a result, interlocal agreements are unlikely to affect local exclusionary land use practices or
the current immunity of the local tax base from the revenue needs of other localities.”).
116 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1998-2002 (2000); Briffault,
supra note 4, at 1123.
117 Briffault, supra note 4, at 1121; see also
FAYETTE COUNTY ISSUES TEA PARTY,
http://fayettecountyissuesteaparty.org/Pages/Regionalism.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013)
(“The [Fayette County Issues Tea Party] supports local (or home) rule and freedom of
association; therefore, it strongly opposes regionalism’s concept of forced centralized
governance.”).
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government.118 Civic participation also generates a sense of community among
citizens by empowering them to shape their localities.119 “[Localists] contend that
home rule should be preserved to ensure that people can define the character of the
communities in which they live.”120 The multitude of government under home-rule
principles most efficiently allocates the best mix of taxes and services by citizens
voting with their feet.121
Localists argue that a regional government would subject large numbers of
people to policies they oppose and to a government whose performance is more
difficult to monitor.122 “[T]he standard arguments for home rule seek to defend the
local freedom and choice that anti-sprawl reform appears to threaten.”123 Localists
use Ohio’s home-rule amendment as legal justification to protect these principles and
combat new programs that would preempt local autonomy.124
D. Today’s Regional Alternative
Nevertheless, advocates of regional solutions have successfully implemented
regional solutions around the country.125 Minneapolis-Saint Paul created a regional
institution with members appointed by the governor and vested with authority over
issues such as transit, water quality, airports, and land-use.126 The Twin Cities
Metropolitan Council’s most distinctive feature is regional revenue-sharing.127 “The
Twin Cities tax-base-sharing program was an attempt to respond to a number of
concerns, including increased property tax rates, tax-base and tax-rate disparities,
and interjurisdictional competition for development.”128 The program requires each
jurisdiction to contribute forty percent of the growth in the value of its commercialindustrial tax capacity to a regional pool.129

118 See Cashin, supra note 116, at 1998-99. “For some, home rule is worth protecting
because it ensures that governmental power is exercised closest to the people.” David J.
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2259 (2003).
119

Barron, supra note 118, at 2255.

120

Id. at 2259-60.

121

See Cashin, supra note 116, at 2000. “For others, home rule is important because it
establishes a ‘market in places’ that promotes efficient competition in the provision of
municipal services.” Barron, supra note 118, at 2259.
122

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1144.

123

Barron, supra note 118, at 2260.

124 See Meck & Wittenberg, supra note 1, at 31; see also Briffault, supra note 4, at 1171
(“Hostility to metropolitan government is intertwined with a commitment to local autonomy
that is deeply rooted in both law and politics.”).
125

Frug, supra note 11, at 1777.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 592.

129

Id. at 592.
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Portland, Oregon, elects a regional body called a “Metro” that is authorized to
regionally plan transportation and land-use but has no revenue-sharing feature.130
Included in the Metro’s ability to regionally plan land-use is the authority to enact
regional growth boundaries.131 The Metro’s goal in managing the urban growth
boundary in the Portland metropolitan area is to protect rural lands and focus
investment in existing downtowns, main streets, and employment areas.132 In a 2002
study by Smart Growth America measuring sprawl in eighty-three metropolitan
areas, Portland ranked eighth,133 and the study cited the Metro’s growth boundary a
“model” to combat sprawl.134
Although Minneapolis and Portland are a positive step according to regionalists,
neither government realizes many regionalists’ goal of a popularly elected regional
government capable of regional revenue sharing and forging binding land-use
policies.135
Because of political opposition to a centralized metropolitan
government, reformers have developed “federative” systems of governments that
would move only some municipal functions to a regional body, like a county.136 In
the 1950s and 1960s, this scheme was developed in Miami-Dade County, NashvilleDavidson County, Jacksonville-Duval County, and Indianapolis-Marion County.137
Or, as demonstrated in New York City and Columbus, another politically viable
regional alternative has been to impose regional structures over existing local
governments.138
The major American cities that have flourished in the twentieth and
twenty first centuries . . . [have all done so through] annex[ing]
neighboring territory, sometimes with the consent of those being absorbed
(Los Angeles, Nashville, Jacksonville), sometimes with the consent only
130

Frug, supra note 11, at 1777.

131

See EWING ET AL., supra note 71, at 23.

132

METRO,
Urban
Growth
Boundary
(last
visited
Feb.
1,
2014),
http://web.archive.org/web/20131219185801/http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.w
eb/id=277 (showing webpage as it appeared on Feb. 1, 2014).
The boundary controls urban expansion onto farm and forest lands. Land inside the
urban growth boundary supports urban services such as roads, water and sewer
systems, parks, schools and fire and police protection that create thriving places to
live, work and play. The urban growth boundary is one of the tools used to protect
farms and forests from urban sprawl and to promote the efficient use of land, public
facilities and services inside the boundary.
Id.
133

Id. at 16.

134

See id. at 23.

135 Frug, supra note 11, at 1777-78; see also Briffault, supra note 4, at 1117 (noting “[n]ot
one major metropolitan area is governed by a single all-encompassing general purpose local
government.”).
136

Briffault, supra note 4, at 1118.

137

Id.

138

Id.
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of the property owners in the annexed areas (Phoenix), and sometimes
without asking anyone’s permission (Houston, Oklahoma City,
Albuquerque).139
North Carolina’s involuntary annexation statutes, for example, have been cited
by regionalists, like David Rusk, as one of the most “progressive” in the country in
terms of providing their municipalities the ability to expand their corporate
boundaries. “Because North Carolina has historically allowed ‘involuntary’
annexation at the discretion of local municipalities, such municipalities have been
able to expand their territories, gain favorable debt finance ratings, and enhance their
tax bases more readily than many municipalities in other parts of the country.”140
Although regional solutions vary depending on the political landscape,
regionalists argue that any regional government that can preempt local land-use
decisions would substantially facilitate a regional consciousness.141
III. HOW A REGIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD
INTERNALIZE THE INFORMATION PROBLEM
By not considering regional externalities, localists fail to recognize that homerule principles inhibit civic participation, community, and efficiency.142 This is
because focusing on a locality’s self-interest blinds citizens from their decisions’
regional impact.143 The absence of regional governments prevents citizens from
participating in regional governmental affairs, recognizing their regional community,
and efficiently allocating a region’s resources.144 “Government should design and
finance public services on a scale commensurate with the scope of their costs and
benefits. If they are not designed on the appropriate scale, then local and regional
interests diverge.”145
An effective regional government that is popularly elected and can preempt local
land-use, on the other hand, could better converge a region’s interest.146 One
important way a regional government would do this is through facilitating a regional
consciousness.147 A regional government requiring interlocal participation would
force localities to consider their policies’ regional impact.148 Mandated participation
139 Frug, supra note 11, at 1768. As an example, North Carolina has Involuntary
Annexation Statutes, which would permit a city to involuntarily annex only areas contiguous
to the city that share at least one-eighth of their external boundaries with that city. Judith
Welch Wegner, North Carolina’s Annexation Wars: Whys, Wherefores, and What Next, 91
N.C. L. REV. 165, 196-97 (2012).
140

Id. at 168.

141

See Frug, supra note 11, at 1827.

142

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1164.

143

See id.

144

See id.

145

Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 604 (citations omitted).

146

See Frug, supra note 11, at 1792.

147

See id.

148

See id.
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would facilitate interlocal negotiation, which could, in turn, help internalize
externalities on emitting localities.149 Affluent localities that choose, for example, to
use exclusionary zoning and not provide any affordable housing, could be subject
under a regional government to compensate regional localities whose taxable bases
are damaged by this policy.
According to David Beach, one of the reasons Ohio was one of only twelve states
in 2002 not pursuing statewide reforms in advancing smart growth was because of
Ohio’s lack of an identity.150 Because Ohio has more large urban areas than any
other state in the Union, the media are fragmented, there are no common sources of
information, no one in Cincinnati knows anything about Dayton, no one in Dayton
knows anything about Columbus, and when you want to change state policies there
is a tremendous educational challenge.151 Ohio’s topography also plays a factor in
Ohio’s cultural fragmentation, as the state is split up into five physiographic
regions.152 “Such divisions . . . make it extremely difficult to convene a statewide
discussion on any topic, much less enact any comprehensive statewide reforms.”153
Consequently, even though abrogating Ohio’s home-rule amendment may be the
most legally direct means of granting regional governments authority to preempt
local land-use authority, doing so would have to overcome tremendous political
hurdles.154 Ohio’s cultural fragmentation, strong home-rule tradition, and the
codification of the amendment in Ohio’s Constitution for over a century would make
the abrogation of the amendment a colossal task.155
But Ohio courts have increasingly marginalized the home-rule amendment over
the past decade.156 This has opened the door for the General Assembly to

149

See id.

150

Beach, supra note 74, at 9.

151

Id.

While people feel attachment to some part of the state (a city, watershed, or region),
they tend not to identify with Ohio as a whole. And that is understandable. Ohio has
no coherent geography, no political or cultural center of gravity, and no mythology
that celebrates it as a distinctive place.
Id.
152 Id. The five physiographic regions are Glaciated Allegheny Plateau, Unglaciated
Allegheny Plateau, Central Lowland Till Plains, Huron-Erie Lake Plains, and Interior Low
Plateau. Id.
153

Id. at 10.

154

See Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 604.

155

See id. Ohio localities may especially be reluctant to abrogate Ohio’s home-rule amendment
lately because the amendment has been used as a legal defense to protect their communities from
the environmental effects of oil and gas drilling. See Anne Foster, Local Ohio Communities Allied
in Defense of Ohio’s Home-Rule, Oil and Gas Showdown To Be Held in Ohio’s Supreme Court,
NORTH AMERICA SHALE BLOG (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.northamericashaleblog.com/2013
/09/18/local-ohio-communities-allied-in-defense-of-the-ohios-home-rule-oil-and-gas-showdownto-be-held-in-ohio-supreme-court/.
156 See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485
(Ohio Feb. 17, 2015); City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 128 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942
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constitutionally enact a statute creating regional governments that can preempt local
land-use in the face of Article XVIII, Section 3.157
A. The Constitutionality of Regional Governments to Preempt
Local Zoning under Canton
Article XVIII, Section 3 provides that municipalities have all powers of local
self-government “and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”158 For
a regional government to have sufficient authority to preempt a municipality’s landuse decisions, it must be permitted to do so by a “general law” within the meaning of
Art. XVIII, Section 3.159 Under this amendment, when municipal zoning conflicts
with the “general laws of the state,” the ordinance is unconstitutional.160
Ohio considers municipal zoning to be an exercise of the state’s police powers
and not an exercise of local self-government.161 If an exercise of local selfgovernment, “the analysis stops, because Ohio’s Constitution authorizes a
municipality to exercise all powers of local self-government within its
jurisdiction.”162 Where, however, there is a conflict of Ohio’s concurrent police
powers, the state’s exercise prevails if the state’s authority is derived from a “general
law” within the meaning Art. XVIII, Section 3.163
In Canton v. Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court defined a “general law,” as a statute
that is (1) part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment; (2) applies to
all parts of the state alike and operates uniformly throughout the sate; (3) sets forth
police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit
municipalities’ legislative power to do so, and (4) prescribes a rule of conduct upon
citizens generally.164
1. A Statute Creating Regional Governments Is Part of a Statewide and
Comprehensive Legislative Enactment
If a state statute concerns subject matter that affects the general public as a whole
more than local inhabitants, the statute is “part of a statewide and comprehensive
N.E.2d 370; Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 2006-Ohio6043, 858 N.E.2d 776.
157

See Shwab, supra note 26, at 480-93.

158 OH. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the
130th GA 2013-2014).
159

See City of Canton v. Ohio, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶

21.
160 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the
130th GA 2013-2014).
161

See Canton, 766 N.E.2d, at ¶ 10.

162 Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d
906, at ¶ 10 (quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 2006Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776).
163

See id.

164

Canton, 766 N.E.2d, at ¶ 21.
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legislative enactment”165 to satisfy the first element of the Canton test.166 In Ohio
Ass’n of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmstead, the Ohio Supreme Court
said “[a] general law has been described as one which promotes statewide
uniformity.”167 The Ohio Supreme Court has upheld natural resource conservation168
and matters with extraterritorial impact as areas of statewide concern.169 There is no
need for a “comprehensive enactment” to regulate every aspect of the disputed
conduct.170
Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.) § 1509.02 preempts a locality’s ability to zone
when the zoning issue concerns a matter of statewide concern.171
The [division of oil and gas resources management] has sole and
exclusive authority to regulate the . . . location[] and spacing of oil and
gas wells and production operations within the state . . . . The regulation
of oil and gas activities is a matter of general statewide interest that
requires uniform statewide regulation . . . .172
In Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., the Ohio Supreme Court upheld O.R.C. §
1509.02 as constitutional under the home-rule amendment because the statute is a
general law.173 In analyzing whether § 1509.02 was a general law, the Ninth District
Court of Appeals “beg[an] with the recognition that [the] oil and gas drilling statute
specifically states that the regulation of oil and gas activities is a matter of general
statewide interest that requires uniform statewide regulation.”174 The Ninth District
held in Smith Family Trust v. Hudson Bd. of Zoning Appeals that § “1509 et seq.
regulates the conservation of natural resources and is unquestionably a general
law.”175
165

Id. at 964.

166

See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ohio
1968).
167 Ohio Ass’n of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. City of N. Olmsted, 602 N.E.2d 1147,
1149 (Ohio 1992).
168

See Columbus v. Teater, 374 N.E.2d 154, 158-59 (Ohio 1978).

169

Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga Cnty., 148 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ohio 1958).

170 City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 128 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, at ¶
21 (citing Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880
N.E.2d 906).
171 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 59 of the 130th
General Assembly).
172

Id.

173 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485, at ¶ 23
(Ohio Feb. 17, 2015).
174

State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85, at ¶ 54
(9th Dist.) (quoting Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 120 Ohio St. 3d 96,
2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, at ¶ 29.).
175 Smith Family Trust v. City of Hudson Bd. of Zoning and Bldg. Appeals, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 24471 2009-Ohio-2557, ¶ 11.
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Similarly, in determining whether a law is part of statewide and comprehensive
legislative enactment, the Court in Cleveland v. Ohio stated in 2010 that “we took
into account that the General Assembly had ‘express[ed] its intent for statewide
comprehensive [laws].”176 The legislative history of the statute in question in
Cleveland indicated the intent to supersede the existing patchwork of ordinances.177
Thus, statutory language expressing the intent of the General Assembly to
supersede the patchwork of zoning ordinances and promote the state’s interest in
combating the extraterritorial impact of urban sprawl would satisfy the first element
of the Canton test.178
2. A Statute Creating Regional Governments Applies to All Parts of the State Alike
and Operates Uniformly throughout the State
Legislation creating regional governments in each of Ohio’s regions would
“apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly”179 to satisfy the second
element of the Canton test. Because no locality operates autonomously and regional
governments should be created in each economically interconnected region to be
constitutional, the statute would apply “to all parts of the state alike.”180
The purpose of the uniformity element “is not ‘to render invalid every law which
does not operate upon all persons, property, or political subdivisions within the
state,’ but simply to ensure that a general law operates uniformly with respect to
every person and locality to which it relates.”181 In Ohioans for Concealed Carry,
Inc. v. City of Clyde, the Ohio Supreme Court held that application of a statutory
framework inherently varies by jurisdiction.182 In a 2014 Cleveland v. Ohio decision,
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a state statute that expressly preempted a
municipality’s ability to regulate tow truck companies.183 Although the application of
this statute would impact Ohio regions differently, the court held that because the
statute’s scope is statewide and there is no limitation upon the statute’s operation, the
statute is uniform throughout the state.184

176

Cleveland, 942 N.E.2d, at ¶ 24.

177

Id. at ¶ 24.

178 See Ohio Ass’n of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. City of N. Olmsted, 602 N.E.2d
1147, 1149 (Ohio 1992); Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga Cnty., 148 N.E.2d 921,
922-23 (Ohio 1958).
179

City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 21.

180

See id.

181

State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485, at ¶ 21
(Ohio Feb. 17, 2015) (citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Stanton v. Powell, 142 N.E. 401
(Ohio 1924)).
182

Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 120 Ohio St. 3d 96, 2008-Ohio4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, at ¶ 43.
183

City of Cleveland v. State, 138 Ohio St. 3d 232, 2014-Ohio-86, 5 N.E.3d 644, at ¶ 5.

184

Id. at ¶ 12.
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Because a statute creating regional governments would have the uniform
framework of promoting regional coordination upon all parts of the state alike, the
second element of the Canton test would be satisfied.185
3. A Statute Deferring Regulatory Power to Implement Interlocal Coordination to
Regional Governments Sets Forth Police Regulations
The third element of the Canton test would be satisfied because decentralizing
land-use authority to regional governments “set[s] forth police [power]
regulations”186 that a locality’s zoning be in accordance with regional policy, “rather
than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation.”187
This element requires that “a statute which prohibits the exercise by a
municipality of its home[-]rule powers[,] without such statute serving an overriding
statewide interest[,] would directly contravene the constitutional grant of municipal
power.”188
In the 2014 Cleveland decision, the Ohio Supreme Court said that in determining
whether a statute establishes police regulations, the statute should also be read in
conjunction with the delegated agency’s regulations.189 A regional government that
is delegated authority to implement regional coordination could promulgate specific
regulations to ensure that localities’ land-use decisions are in accordance with
regional policy to serve a statewide interest.
In Morrison, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the state reserving for itself “the
permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas wells” under § 1509.02 is a
legitimate state interest.190 Similarly, a statute creating regional governments to serve
the state interest in efficient regional land-use coordination is legitimate.191 Like §
1509.02, a statute creating regional governments would “preserve . . . regulatory
control given to municipalities” but at the same time prevent municipalities from
“exercising those powers in a way that . . . impedes” the state’s interest in regional
coordination.192
Thus, like § 1509.02 under Morrison, a statute creating regional governments
could set forth a specific police power to regulate the land use of a specific subject,
except instead of “oil and gas wells” with regional governments it would be regional
land-use coordination.193 Because such a statute would set forth a police power
regulation and only limit the legislative power of a municipal corporation when in

185

See id.

186

City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 21.

187

Id.

188 Id. at ¶ 32 (quoting Clermont Env’t Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 442 N.E.2d 1278,
1282 (Ohio 1982)).
189

Cleveland, 5 N.E.3d 644, at ¶ 13.

190

See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485, at ¶
30 (Ohio Feb. 17, 2015).
191

See id.

192

See id.

193

See id.
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conflict with the state’s interest in regional coordination, the third element of the
Canton test would be satisfied.194
4. A Statute Creating Regional Governments Prescribes a Rule of Conduct on
Citizens Generally
The fourth element of the Canton test that “prescribe[s] a rule of conduct on
citizens generally”195 requires that a statute apply generally to all who would fall
within the sphere of its legislation.196 In American Fin. Services Ass’n v. City of
Cleveland, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute, which prevented lenders
from engaging in predatory lending, prescribed a rule of conduct on citizens
generally because the statute specifically prescribed a rule of conduct on all state
lenders.197 Also, in the 2014 Cleveland decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
statute that expressly preempted a municipality’s ability to regulate tow truck
companies prescribed a rule of conduct upon citizens generally because “the statute
applies to all entities engaged in towing operations.”198
Similarly, a statute applying to all Ohio localities to regionally coordinate
through the mechanism of a regional government would satisfy the fourth element of
the Canton test to prescribe a rule of conduct on citizens generally.199
5. By the Ohio General Assembly Expressing a Clear Intent to Further the State
Interest of Regional Coordination, a Statute Creating Regional Governments Would
Constitute a General Law
Because a statute creating regional governments in each economically
interconnected Ohio region can satisfy all four prongs of the Canton test, this statute
would constitute a “general law” within the meaning of Article XVIII, Section 3.200
“Although the courts have established some basic principles regarding home[-]rule
powers, they are not always consistently applied.”201 But as demonstrated, courts
have not been willing to construe the home-rule amendment broadly when the
General Assembly has demonstrated a clear intent to divest localities of the power in
furtherance of a state interest.202
Because it is in the state’s interest to control urban sprawl, protect Ohio’s natural
resources, and benefit metropolitan economies, statutory authority preempting local
194

See id.

195

City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 21.

196

See Shwab, supra note 26, at 492.

197

Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858
N.E.2d 776, ¶ 36.
198

City of Cleveland v. State, 138 Ohio St. 3d 232, 2014-Ohio-86, 5 N.E.3d 644, at ¶ 5.

199

See id.

200

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the
130th GA 2013-2014).
201 Wendy H. Gridley, Municipal Home Rule, MEMBERS ONLY, Jan. 26. 2010, at 1,
http://www.lsc.ohio.gov/membersonly/128municipalhomerule.pdf.
202 See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485, at ¶
30 (Ohio Feb. 17, 2015).
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land-use planning is constitutional.203 As Morrison demonstrated, a statute that
curtails a locality’s zoning authority for specific state interests is constitutional.204 As
a general law with the specific state interest of facilitating regional coordination, the
statutory enactment of regional governments would be constitutional, even in the
face of Ohio’s home-rule amendment.205
A. The Need for a Statutory Enactment Creating Regional Governments
The reason regional governments, as opposed to public state agencies, are
necessary is because citizens need to foster a regional consciousness for meaningful
regional coordination to occur.206 “Political cooperation . . . must be the first step
towards regional cooperation.”207 Because government is accountable to voters, a
regional government would facilitate both legitimacy among voters and the idea of
regional citizenship.208 “To be effective, a regional legislature would have the power
to ensure that its decisions, once made, will be followed by a region’s cities,”209 and
a legitimate regional government would help maintain this authority.
Although annexation statutes are a step in the right direction towards creating
more regional forms of government, the statutes can facilitate interlocal conflict and
exacerbate a region’s ability to foster a regional consciousness.210 For example,
although regionalists have long touted North Carolina’s progressive state municipal
annexation laws, these same laws have sparked “significant annexation wars” and “a
number of lawsuits.”211 When the City of Buffalo attempted to merge into its
surrounding county, Erie County, in 2004, proponents of the measure met resistance
among those who saw it as attempting to augment suburban power at the expense of
city residents.212 “[H]ad genuine input from numerous stakeholders and ordinary
citizens generated proposals for regionalism, [the proposal] could have survived
. . . .”213
203

See id.

204

Id.

205

See id.

206

See Frug, supra note 11, at 1827.

207

See Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 612.

208

Briffault, supra note 4, at 1165-66.

[O]nly an elected regional government would enjoy the legitimacy that would enable
it to displace the decisions of component local governments. And only an elected
regional government would be able to assure voters they have a voice in policymaking
and that regional decisionmaking institutions would ultimately be accountable to area
residents.
Id. at 1166.
209

Frug, supra note 11, at 1792.

210

See Wegner, supra note 139, at 165.

211

Id. at 165, 168.

212

Craig R. Bucki, Regionalism Revisited: The Effort to Streamline Governance in Buffalo
and Erie County, New York, 71 ALB. L. REV. 117, 131, 138-39 (2008).
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Id. at 120.
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Furthermore, imposing regional governance on an existing governmental entity
may only be a short-term solution.214 Major metropolitan areas today are far larger in
population and territory than the largest city in the region.215 “[E]ven in New York
[City], success was ultimately undone by the expansion of the metropolitan area
beyond the boundaries of the consolidated city.”216 Thus, the question as to what
governmental scale would appropriately be commensurate with a given region will
fluidly change over time, requiring a dynamic entity able to respond to the regional
issues of the time.217 Because a regional government, on the other hand, is merely a
vehicle for regional collaboration, it can more quickly respond to changing regional
issues.218
“No meaningful regional consciousness, let alone regional citizenship, now exists
in major American metropolitan areas.”219 However, unlike annexed or consolidated
localities, “a regional citizenship is a worthwhile goal because it would help foster
the kind of regional thinking needed to address metropolitan problems.”220
Regional governments should not only “serve as a vehicle for intercity
negotiations designed to forge a regional perspective”221 but also an authority on
policies that bind regions.222 Because local land-use “is a major source of
metropolitan externalities,” regional authority should be broad enough to include
land-use decisions.223 A legitimate regional government with sufficient power to
preempt local land-use decisions would help generate the idea of regional
citizenship.224 Regional policies will require an understanding of how one locality’s
policies impact a region, which would help address localities’ regional ignorance
embodied in the information problem.225
Localists validly argue that regionalism threatens their local autonomy by
making it more difficult for them to effect change in larger governments and

214

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1164.

215

Id. at 1116.

216

Id. at 1117.
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See id.
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See id.
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Frug, supra note 11, at 1827.
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Id.
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Id. at 1827.
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Compare id. at 1791 (arguing that regional governments should be created for one
purpose: “to serve as a vehicle for intercity negotiations designed to forge a regional
perspective on metropolitan issues”), with Briffault, supra note 4, at 1166 (arguing that the
optimal regional government must also determine land-use questions of regional significance).
223

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1147. “Localities simply do not enter into cooperative
arrangements under which some localities accept regionally necessary but locally undesirable
land uses. Similarly, localities rarely, if ever, agree to desist form competing for development
against other localities in the same metropolitan area.” Id.
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See id.
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See id.
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removing the choice of living under low-cost government.226 But “in light of the
intertwined relationships of local areas in metropolitan regions, we should redefine
the scope of local autonomy . . . .”227 Local governments are not receptive to regional
issues, which threatens residents’ local autonomy to have a voice in policies that
affect them.228 Although there is evidence that a multitude of governments in a
metropolitan area hold down local government costs, this argument disregards the
costs associated with infrastructure and governmental overlap created by a profusion
of government within a region.229
Contrary to arguments made by localists,230 regional governments would
facilitate community and civic participation by helping citizens recognize themselves
as part of a regional community.231 By focusing on the local community, citizens
blind themselves to the regional community “economically and socially intertwined”
with one’s locality.232 “The defining feature of traditional localities—intensity of
interaction within the locality and separation of that locality from others—are
increasingly absent in the metropolitan setting.”233
Metropolitan residents don’t focus their activities strictly within their localities,
and metropolitan businesses don’t draw most of their customers and employees from
their home localities.234 But even though metropolitan residents have increasingly
interacted with their metropolitan areas, today “local boundaries often become the
basis of interlocal conflicts.”235 Under our current governmental structure, there is a
“winner take all” situation when one locality, for example, builds a shopping
center.236 This shopping center may negatively affect businesses in neighboring
localities.237 But the locality building the shopping center is typically only concerned
with its residents and interests.238 Regional government could mitigate this conflict
226

See id. at 1123-25.

The costs of participation in terms of time, energy, and money needed to reach out,
engage, and persuade other members of the polity are likely to be lower in smaller
units than in larger ones . . . . This results in an increased sense of ‘citizen
effectiveness,’ which, by rewarding participation, is likely to result in further
participation.
Id.
227

Id. at 1122.
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See id. at 1133.
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Id. at 1125.
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See Cashin, supra note 116, at 1998-2002.
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See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1164.
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See id. at 1143.
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See Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 596.
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by facilitating citizens’ regional consciousness and providing a means to civically
address interlocal disputes.239
B. How Regional Governments Present a More Effective Structure for the Economic
Health of Ohio’s Regions
Because today’s citizen is a regional creature, our current governmental structure
isn’t adequately addressing citizens’ needs.240 This structure inefficiently wastes
resources by increasing costs of governmental services, urban sprawl, and individual
expenditures.241 Regional governments would more effectively address these issues
through the lens of regional solutions.242 Furthermore, regional governments would
facilitate the regional consciousness necessary to implement meaningful, long-term
regional coordination.243
1. Regional Governments Would More Efficiently Streamline Regional
Infrastructure and Government
Regional planning can drive down costs by streamlining capital investment,
maintenance, and the infrastructure and governmental overlap incidental to urban
sprawl.244 “[T]he marginal cost of new development closer to existing services or
facilities is lower. However, because costs currently are evenly distributed among all
users by average-cost pricing, those who live further away pay proportionately less.
As a result, some users subsidize other users.”245
Bills for services, like water and sewer services, are assessed on an average cost
basis.246 Even though new development makes providing these services more
expensive, politicians don’t marginally price these services to reflect the costs
because they “don’t like to charge voters one rate and others a different one.”247
Thus, the problem is a political one, and a regional government could help eliminate
this political dilemma and align costs with services by setting regional policy, like a
regional growth boundary.248
Regional governments can also improve efficiency by providing visibility of
overlapping governmental functions with duplicative services that “hire too many for

239

See id. at 1165.

240

See id. at 1133.

241

See id. at 604.
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See id.

243

See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1137.
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See Citistat, MOVING TO CORN FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, OH),
1996, at 55, http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/movingtocornfields.pdf.
245 Kevin Kasowaski, Sprawling Development Costs All of Us a Bundle, MOVING TO CORN
FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, OH), 1996, at 24, available at
http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/movingtocornfields.pdf.
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Kasowski, supra note 110, at 5.
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Id.
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See EWING ET AL., supra note 71, at 23.
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little in return.”249 This could be done by requiring interlocal negotiations while
initiating informational campaigns that inform citizens of governmental overlap and
the possible savings that could be gained through integration.250 Visibility of these
inefficiencies and forced negotiation could streamline governmental costs across
localities.251 “Greater Cleveland’s population problem screams out for regional
government . . . . The result is a massive waste of tax dollars by the central city and
suburbs, a waste that cries out for more shared services between municipalities, if
not outright mergers.”252
2. Regional Governments Would More Effectively Address Regional Land-Use
Issues Like Urban Sprawl
Effective regional land-use policies over time can both reduce costs and generate
regional economic growth.253 Some regional land-use issues, like urban sprawl, can
only be addressed by regional policies because they are not the result of a single
locality’s externalities imposed on the region but the aggregate result of local
decisions.254 “[T]he local government system makes it difficult for localities to take
action to control sprawl.”255 However, as Portland, Oregon has demonstrated, a
metropolitan growth boundary created by its regional government can effectively
deal with this problem.256
Policies that curb urban sprawl will capture more of the metropolitan growth in
the existing metropolitan area.257 This could result in more investment in
metropolitan inner cities; a rejuvenated image of the face of the region to attract new
businesses, tourists, and residents; and a benefit to the economic health of the entire
region.258 “The central city typically shapes outsiders’ images of the region and
249

Bucki, supra note 211, at 136.

There are over 1250 local governments in the Chicago area, including six counties and
261 municipalities; nearly 300 local governments in the Pittsburgh area, including
more than 100 municipalities; more than 300 governments in Seattle, including three
counties and sixty-five cities and towns; and approximately 350 governments,
including 168 cities and towns, in metropolitan Baltimore.
Briffault, supra note 4, at 1119.
250

See Frolik, supra note 15, at 7.
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See id.

252 BRENT LARKIN, WHAT POPULATION LOSS IS COSTING CLEVELAND—AND WHY IT MATTERS,
NORTHEAST OHIO MEDIA GROUP, JUNE 19, 2014, HTTP://WWW.CLEVELAND.COM/OPINION
/INDEX.SSF/2014/06/WHAT_POPULATION_LOSS_IS_COSTIN.HTML
(INTERNAL
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See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1137.

254

See id. at 1164.
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See EWING ET AL., supra note 71, at 23.
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See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1139.
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See id. “Central cities remain focal points for economic production, higher education,
health care, and entertainment. Nearly half of suburban households have at least one family
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thereby determines the region’s capacity to attract firms, high-skilled workers, and
tourists and conventioneers.”259
“[A] growing body of research . . . suggests a tie between suburban growth and
the economic health of central cities.”260 The high correlation between city and
suburban growth in employment, income, and population indicates that the
metropolitan area is an economically integrated entity “whose various component
local parts tend to rise or fall together.”261 Thus, it makes little sense for a region’s
components to win at the expense of another.262
Former leader of the Cuyahoga County Mayors and Managers Association,
Bruce Akers has spent more than a decade trying push a new model of regional
cooperation that is premised on two ideas: (1) every community in greater Cleveland
will sink or swim together; and (2) Cleveland’s fate will dictate everyone else’s.263
Another policy that would more effectively be addressed by regional
governments would be regional agreement to mitigate the use of exclusionary zoning
and implement more mixed-use areas.264 A mixed-use area mixes “different land
uses, often placing housing near shops, or offices above storefronts.”265 A defining
characteristic of sprawl is the strict segregation of different land-uses.266 In sprawling
regions, housing is typically separated from shopping, offices, civic centers, and
schools.267 This separation creates an imbalance, where workers cannot find housing
close to work and exacerbates sprawl by requiring workers to live in further
localities.268
Mixed-use zoning eliminates this separation and, consequently, curbs regional
sprawl.269 Regional policies that require localities to implement mixed-use zoning
would reduce the ability for localities to use exclusionary zoning to grow their tax
bases.270 Reduced exclusionary zoning no longer diverts as much metropolitan
burdens to its neighbors, which would not only combat sprawl by providing cheaper
housing options in these localities but also reduce the incentive for new homebuyers
to seek cheap housing in the metropolitan fringe areas.271
member who works in the central city. Consequently, it is not surprising that suburban
housing prices are affected by employment growth in the central city.” Id.
259
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Although less effective,272 the Twin Cities tax-base-sharing model is another way
to combat regional sprawl.273 “[T]ax-base sharing weakens [governmental] incentive
to waste taxpayer dollars by stealing it away from other communities . . . [or] restrict
residential development to profitable types of housing, making efficient land-use
planning easier.”274 The Twin cities model shows that by capturing the growth in the
tax base, this diminishes the incentive for a locality to engage in exclusionary
zoning.275 By mitigating the incentive for Twin City localities to vie for revenuegenerating land uses, their incentives are more aligned “to engage in more thoughtful
and beneficial land-use planning.”276
Tax-base-sharing also reduces tax disparities within a region and levels the
playing field in encouraging reinvestment in regional inner-cities and other fiscally
distressed communities.277 Because tax-base-sharing reduces the incentive for
localities to compete in drawing a region’s wealthy through lower tax rates, the Twin
cities area manifests less of a tax-rate disparity.278 “As a result of the sharing
program, local tax-base disparities narrowed significantly (by roughly twenty
percent).”279
3. Curbing Urban Sprawl Will Reduce Costs Imposed on Individuals
Urban sprawl imposes quantifiable costs by requiring individuals living in
sprawling regions to drive more miles, suffer more traffic accidents, own more cars,
pay for more car insurance, and breathe more polluted air.280 In a 2002 study by
Smart Growth America, sprawl was found to be a greater predictor than numerous
demographic control variables to higher rates of driving and vehicle ownership.281
“Average household vehicle ownership is an indicator of the degree to which a
region’s population is dependent on automobiles for basic transportation . . . in
sprawling areas where driving is the only way to get around, more households feel
compelled to have a vehicle for each licensed driver.”282
Because mass-transit requires that most journeys be concentrated to a limited
number of destinations, the dispersed nature of regional sprawl precludes mass

272 In a study measuring the sprawl of 83 metropolitan areas by Smart Growth America, the
Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan area was 38th most sprawling area. See EWING ET AL.,
supra note 71, at 15.
273

See Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 597.
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Id. at 601 (internal citations omitted).
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See id. at 605 (emphasis added).
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transit.283 Thus, urban sprawl has a major influence on energy consumption and other
individual costs incidental to vehicle-miles traveled.284
By reducing sprawl, the number of commuters walking, biking, or taking transit
to work increases significantly.285 The metropolitan areas that are more sprawling
have 2.3 percent of workers taking public transportation to work, while less
sprawling areas have 5.1 percent of workers taking public transportation.286
“[R]esearch has been piling up that establishes a link between the spread of sprawl
and the rise of obesity in our country.”287 In an interview with Richard Jackson, MD,
a pediatrician and chair of the Environmental and Health Sciences at UCLA, said
that New Yorkers, the ultimate walkers, weigh on average six or seven pounds less
than suburban Americans.288 As the distance among where we live, work, shop and
socialize increases, more time is spent in the car and less times is spent exercising.289
4. Atlanta’s Sprawl
Atlanta is consistently included as one of the most sprawling metropolitan areas
in the country.290 In ranking 83 metropolitan areas by Smart Growth America,
Atlanta was ranked 4th most sprawling.291 “The Atlanta metro area is hyperexpanded to a space larger than the entirety of Massachusetts.”292 Between 1990 and
2006, Atlanta’s metropolitan area expanded 47 percent and today is the least densely
populated metropolitan area in the country.293
Atlanta is also consistently ranked as one of the worst commuter cities in the
country.294 This was evident on January 28, 2014,295 when Atlanta suffered from a
snowstorm that stranded thousands on its roads and required authorities to help
motorists in rescue efforts.296 “The proximate cause of the . . . traffic catastrophe . . .
283
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Francesca Levy, Best and Worst Cities for Commuters, FORBES.COM (Feb. 1, 2014),
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295 See Matthew Yglesias, Atlanta is a Regional Transportation Planning Disaster,
MONEYBOX
(Jan.
29,
2014),
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/2014/01/29/atlanta_traffic_nightmare_terrible_regional_planning.html.
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(Jan. 30, 2014), http://nation.time.com/2014/01/30/atlanta-weather-traffic-school-closingssnow-abandoned-cars/.
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is a normally warm area grappling with unusual snowfall. But the larger story here is
that . . . [Atlanta is] really a mess as far as a regional transportation planning
viewpoint.”297
The Atlanta metropolitan area has 16,000 miles of roads, the second-highest
miles per capita of metropolitan areas in the country.298 In 2013, the American Lung
Association ranked Atlanta 18 out of 277 metropolitan areas for annual particle
pollution.299 The region’s growth has depleted water resources in the area, raising
concerns about water quantity and quality.300 Half of all Georgians drink water from
the Chattahoochee River, and the river’s water quality is being threatened by
rampant suburban growth.301
In response, the Georgia General Assembly established The Georgia Regional
Transportation Authority in 1999 to oversee transportation and land use and promote
smart growth measures to bring businesses closer to homes.302 These measures have
achieved some success, as Atlanta has reversed its long population decline303 and
grew about 6 percent over the past couple of years.304
But the Atlanta area still has a ways to go to realize a regional consciousness.305
In 2013, the Atlanta Braves announced that they were moving twelve miles
northwest of Atlanta to Cobb County.306 “When we talk about sharing the cost of our
regional infrastructure, that does not mean duplicating an existing stadium . . . . That
is not regionalism. That is one county government looking out for its own selfinterest at the expense of another government . . . .”307
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5. Regional Governments Would Facilitate the Regional Consciousness Necessary
for Meaningful, Long-Term Regional Coordination
Given that there are no metropolitan areas today governed by a single allencompassing general-purpose government,308 the political challenges are immense.
In response to the Northeast Ohio Sustainable Community’s Coalition’s (NEOSCC)
initiative to present a regional plan for Northeast Ohio, the Wayne County Tea Party
wrote on its website that the “NEOCC is pushing this baloney about looking into the
future and putting our people into high-density areas to live using bicycles and mass
transportation in the future.”309
But these challenges are slowly being eroded: walkable neighborhoods are
gaining momentum in the real estate market with more baby boomers preferring the
greater convenience of in-town living;310 public officials are looking to regionalism
to shore up the fiscal health of their municipalities;311 and metropolitan areas are
looking to regional cooperation for development.312
There is also a generational shift, as demonstrated by a 2011 survey by real estate
firm Robert Charles Lesser & Co., where 77 percent of millennials said they planned
to live in the “urban core.”313 CNN reported on January 2, 2015 that public
transportation use across the country has risen twelve of the past fifteen quarters.314
“Since 2007, Americans have been driving less . . . . The public transportation
industry says commuters could gain an average annual savings of $9,635 by taking
public transit instead of driving.”315
Higher fuel costs are also changing our behavior.316 The building of the suburbs
was built on the assumption of cheap oil.317 However, from 2000 to 2008, the
inflation adjusted price of a barrel of crude oil rose by 166 percent.318 “It’s no
coincidence that where gas costs more-in Europe, for example, there is less

308
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http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2015

31

896

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:865

sprawl.”319 Rising fuel prices are trumping the notion that housing is cheaper the
further you travel from the metropolitan center.320
Corporate headquarters are beginning to relocate back to cities from their
massive suburban office parks.321 In Chicago, United Airlines, Hillshire Brands, and
Motorola Mobility each moved their headquarters from the suburbs to the city within
the last ten years.322 In Detroit, Quicken Loans relocated from suburban Livonia to
the city in 2011. In Philadelphia, venture capital firm First Round Capital moved
from the suburbs to the city in 2012.323 In San Francisco, some of the newest startups are shirking Silicon Valley for the city, like Twitter, Zynga, Airbnb, Dropbox,
Uber, Pinterest, and Yelp.324 “The list goes on and on as companies competing for
younger workers realize they need to move to where the talent wants to live.”325
According to a report published on February 24, 2014 by City Observatory, a
think tank, city-center employment has grown in recent years, leaving less people
employed in the surrounding suburbs.326 The report found that employment within a
three-mile radius of central business districts climbed half a percent between 2007
and 2011, while employment in the surrounding metropolitan areas declined onetenth of a percent.327 “People increasingly desire to live, work, shop and play in the
same place, and to commute shorter distances—particularly the young and educated,
who are the most coveted employees.”328 Also, employers are increasingly realizing
the economic benefit of working in the urban core: “For a certain sector of
knowledge jobs, ideas bloom from spontaneous, face-to-face interaction in coffee
shops or elevators.”329
But to implement meaningful, long-term regional coordination, a regional
consciousness is critical.330 Regional consciousness is critical to create regions that
work together, rather than against one another.331 David Beach said that one way to
muster political support for smart growth reform in Ohio would be to appeal to
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citizens’ local and regional sensibilities to instill a regional consciousness.332 A
regional consciousness defeats this us-versus-them mentality.333 “Regional land[-]use
planning and regional redistribution are unlikely to occur without some clear sense
among area residents of the region as a distinct community with shared interests and
a common fate.”334 If a region more equitably distributes metropolitan growth and
costs, this could mitigate racial, social, and political tensions, which both reduces the
costs of these social problems and reinforces a positive image of the region.335
For instance, instead of concentrating a region’s poor into its inner cities,
regional policies could require affordable housing across localities to make a region
more economically homogenous. Economic segregation is correlated with higher
crime and unemployment rates.336 “[A]s the disparity in per capita income between
the central city and its suburbs rises, the overall economic health of the metropolitan
region declines . . . . Areas with near parity in per capita income or in which the city
had higher per capita income showed even greater employment growth.”337 Lower
crime rates would reduce the costs of hiring law enforcement and facilitate economic
growth by creating a safer environment for business.338
When the Twin Cities created the first metropolitan government in the country
with the authority over regional tax-base-sharing in 1975,339 criticism at the time
labeled the initiative as economic socialism340 and central-city versus suburban
warfare.341 But “[t]he Act’s ultimate success required a unique coalition of centralcity and suburban legislators working together to ensure the future economic vitality
of the entire state.”342 Faced with rising public discontent over soaring property
taxes, disparities in education between property-tax-rich and property-tax-poor
districts, and the precarious conditions of municipality fiscal health within the
region, the Act ultimately succeeded.343
332 See Beach, supra note 74, at 9-10. “If there is no strong ‘Ohio’ identity, what do
Ohioans identify with? This will be an important question for a statewide movement for smart
growth to answer . . . People have roots in Ohio, but the roots are probably local. So (sic)
organizing strategies for smart growth may have to appeal to local or regional sensibilities.”
Id. at 10.
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Because U.S. Census Bureau estimates show that “four northern Ohio counties
ranked among the top 10 nationally for losing population” from 2011-2012,344 Ohio
may be ripe for political change. Even affluent communities today are beginning to
realize that they can’t stand alone in providing governmental services.345 The Mayor
of Hudson, Ohio, an affluent Cleveland and Akron suburb,346 has called for regional
tax-sharing, even though he acknowledges the political obstacles of such a
measure.347 “But he thinks that Northeast Ohio has no choice but to change.” When
regions are becoming increasingly insolvent and disparate, “there are two viable
options: either allow the disparity to deepen or work to find solutions that can benefit
all.”348
IV. CONCLUSION
Although home-rule principles may have been appropriate in 1912, when
localities were economically autonomous entities with available land to continue to
grow, today “local fiscal health depends primarily on the health of the regional
economy and on social conditions within the locality, which are largely beyond the
power of localities, to control.”349 Fundamentally, the problem is informational,
where citizens are blinded from regional policies that significantly affect their lives.
The Ohio General Assembly should address this information problem by creating
regional governments. Regional governments would not only provide citizens a
vehicle to participate in policies that affect them but would also reduce costs and
promote regional growth. Regional governments could reduce costs by requiring
interlocal negotiations and shedding light on these inefficiencies. Effective regional
policies could curb aggregate externalities, like urban sprawl, and promote
investment in the existing metropolitan area.
However, regional governments will also be beneficial to Ohio’s regions by
driving long-term regional coordination through developing a regional consciousness
among its citizenry.350 Through regional government, Ohio can more efficiently
expend its resources and have greater control in investing in the economic engine of
its regions by investing in regional inner cities.
This is particularly important today, when American metropolitan areas compete
globally.351 In a 2013 interview Blair Rubel, Director of the Wilson Center’s Global
Sustainability and Resilience Center, said,
If you take a look at places that are doing relatively better, there are lot of
experiments that are taking place in Latin America-a lot of improvement
in Latin American cities. Brazilian cities are probably cutting edge in
344
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terms of urban management . . . . Unfortunately, we in the United States
are so taken with our exceptional status, that we often don’t look at
experiments that are taking place outside the United States.352
The greater efficiency and effective investment that regional government could
provide Ohio’s regions can make Ohio’s metropolitan areas more globally
competitive and return economic benefits to Ohio’s regions and the state as a whole.
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